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Abstract
The new Basel Capital Accord has opened up a discussion con-
cerning the measurement of operational risk for banks. In our paper
we do not take a stand on the issue of whether or not a quantita-
tively measured risk capital charge for operational risk is desirable,
however, given that such measurement would come about, we review
some of the tools which may be useful towards the statistical analysis
of operational loss data.
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1 Introduction
In [9], the following denition of operational risk is to be found: \The risk
of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and
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systems or from external events." In its consultative document on the New
Basel Capital Accord (also referred to as Basel II or the Accord), the Basel
Committee for Banking Supervision continues its drive to increase market
stability in the realms of market-, credit- and, most recently, operational
risk. The approach is based on a three pillar concept where Pillar 1 corre-
sponds to a Minimal Capital Requirement, Pillar 2 stands for a Supervisory
Review Process and nally Pillar 3 concerns Market Discipline. Applied to
credit and operational risk, within Pillar 1, quantitative modelling techniques
play a fundamental role, especially for those banks opting for an advanced,
internal measurement approach. It may well be discussed to what extent
a capital charge for operational risk (estimated at about 12% of the current
economic capital) is of importance; see Dan elson et al. [21], Pezier [47, 48]
for detailed, critical discussions on this and further issues underlying the
Accord. In our paper we start from the preamble that a capital charge
for operational risk will come about (eventually starting in 2006) and dis-
cuss some quantitative techniques which may eventually become useful in
discussing the appropriateness of such a charge, especially for more detailed
internal modelling. Independent of the nal regulatory decision, the methods
discussed in our paper have a wider range of applications within quantitative
risk management for the nancial (including insurance) industry.
In Table 1, taken from Crouhy et al. [17], we have listed some typical
types of operational risks. It is clear from this table that some risks are
dicult to quantify (like incompetence under people risk) whereas others
lend themselves much easier to quantication (as for instance execution error
under transaction risk). As already alluded to above, most of the techniques
discussed in this paper will have a bearing on the latter types of risk. In the3
1. People risk:  Incompetency
 Fraud
2. Process risk:
A. Model risk  Model/methodology error
 Mark{to{model error
B. Transaction risk  Execution error
 Product complexity
 Booking error
 Settlement error
 Documentation/contract risk
C. Operational control risk  Exceeding limits
 Security risks
 Volume risk
3. Technology risk:  System failure
 Programming error
 Information risk
 Telecommunications failure
Table 1: Types of operational risks (Crouhy et al. [17]).
terminology of Pezier [48], this corresponds to the ordinary operational risks.
Clearly, the modelling of the latter type of risks is insucient to base a full
capital charge concept on.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we rst look at some
stylised facts of operational risk losses before formulating, in a mathematical
form, the capital charge problem for operational risk (Pillar 1) in Section 3.
In Section 4 we present a possible theory together with its limitations for
analysing such losses, given that a suciently detailed loss data base is avail-
able. We also discuss some of the mathematical research stemming from
questions related to operational risk.4
2 Data and preliminary stylised facts
Typically, operational risk losses are grouped in a number of categories (like
in Table 1). In Pezier [48], these categories are further aggregated to the
three levels nominal, ordinary and exceptional operational risks. Within each
category, losses are (or better said, have to be) well dened. Below we give
an example of historical loss information for three dierent loss types. These
losses correspond to transformed real data. As banks are gathering data,
besides reporting current losses, an eort is made to build up data bases going
back about 10 years. The latter no doubt involves possible selection bias,
a problem one will have to live with till more substantial data warehouses on
operational risk are becoming available. One possibility for the latter could
be cross{banking pooling of loss data in order to nd the main characteristics
of the underlying loss distributions against which a participating bank's own
loss experience can be calibrated. Such data pooling is well{known from
non{life insurance or credit risk management. For Basel II, one needs to
look very carefully into the economic desirability of such a pooling from a
regulatory, risk management point of view. Whereas such a pooling would
be most useful for the very rare, large losses (exceptional losses), at the same
time, such losses are often very specic to the institution and hence from
that point of view make pooling more than questionable.
For obvious reasons, operational risk data are hard to come by. One
reason is no doubt the condentiality, another the relatively short historical
period over which historical data have been consistently gathered. From the
quantiable real data we have seen in practice, we summarise below some
of the stylised facts; these seem to be accepted throughout the industry
for several operational risk categories. By way of example, in Figures 1, 2
and 3 we present loss information on three types of operational losses, for the5
purpose of this paper referred to as Types 1, 2 and 3. As stated above, these
data correspond to modied real data. In Figure 4 we have pooled these
losses across types. For these pooled losses, Figure 5 contains quarterly loss
numbers. The stylised facts observed are:
{ loss amounts very clearly show extremes, whereas
{ loss occurrence times are denitely irregularly spaced in time, also
showing (especially for Type 3, see also Figure 5) a tendency to increase
over time. This non{stationarity can partly be due to the already men-
tioned selection bias.
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Figure 1: Operational risk losses,
Type 1, n = 162.
 
 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
Figure 2: Operational risk losses,
Type 2, n = 80.
Any serious attempt of analytic modelling will at least have to take the
above stylised facts into account. The analytic modelling referred to is not
primarily aimed at calculating a risk{capital charge, but more at nding a
sensible quantitative summary going beyond the pure descriptive. Similar
approaches are well{known from the realm of reliability (see for instance
Bedford and Cooke [10]), (non{life) insurance, reinsurance and total quality
control (like in Does et al. [22]).6
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Figure 3: Operational risk losses,
Type 3, n = 175.
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Figure 4: Pooled operational risk
losses, n = 417.
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Figure 5: Quarterly loss num-
bers for the pooled operational risk
losses.
 
 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
Figure 6: Fire insurance loss data,
n = 417.7
In order to show some similarities with property insurance loss data, in
Figure 6 we present n = 417 losses from a re insurance loss database. For
the full set of data, see Embrechts et al. [29], Figure 6.2.12.
Clearly, the large losses are of main concern, and hence, extreme value
theory (EVT) can play a major role in analysing such data. Similar re-
marks have been made before concerning operational risk; see for instance
Cruz [18] and Medova [42]. At this point, we would like to clarify a miscon-
ception which seems to persist in the literature; see for instance Pezier [48].
In no way will EVT be able to \predict" exceptional operational risk losses
like those present in the Barings case for instance. Already in the intro-
duction to Embrechts et al. [29], it was stated very clearly that EVT is not
a magical tool producing estimates out of thin air but it tries to make the
best use of whatever data one may have about extreme phenomena. More-
over, and indeed equally important, EVT formulates very clearly under what
conditions estimates on extreme events can be worked out. Especially con-
cerning exceptional losses (Pezier [48]), there is very little statistical theory,
including EVT, can contribute. Therefore, throughout the paper, we will
only apply EVT to operational risk data which have some sort of underlying
repetitiveness.
3 The problem
In order to investigate the kind of methodological problems one faces when
trying to calculate a capital charge for (quantiable) operational risks, we
introduce some mathematical notation.
A typical operational risk data base will consist of realisations of random8
variables

Y
t;i
k : t =1 ;:::;T; i=1 ;:::;s and k =1 ;:::;N
t;i	
where
{ T stands for the number of years (T = 10, say);
{ s corresponds to the number of loss{types (for instance s =6 ) ,a n d
{ Nt;i is the (random) number of losses in year t of type i.
Note that, in reality, Y
t;i
k is actually thinned from below, i.e.
Y
t;i
k = Y
t;i
k IfY
t;i
k dt;ig
where dt;i is some lower threshold below which losses are disregarded. Here
IA(!) = 1 whenever ! 2 A, and 0 otherwise. Hence, the total loss{amount
for year t becomes
Lt =
s X
i=1
Nt;i X
k=1
Y
t;i
k ;t =1 ;:::;T: (1)
One of the capital charge measures discussed by the industry (Basel II) is
the Value{at{Risk (VaR) at signicance  (typically 0:001    0:0025 for
operational risk losses) for next year's operational loss variable LT+1. Hence
OR{VaR
T+1
1− = F
 
LT+1(1 − );
where F  
LT+1 denotes the (generalised) inverse of the distribution function
FLT+1, also referred to as its quantile function. For a discussion of generalised
inverses, see Embrechts et al. [29], p. 130. For a graphical denition, see
Figure 7.
It is clear that, with any realistically available number T years worth
of data, an in{sample estimation of VaR at this low signicance level  is9
f (x) LT+1
x
OR−VaRT+1
1−
100   %
a
a
Figure 7: Calculation of operational risk VaR.
impossible. Moreover, at this aggregated loss level, across a wide range of
operational risk types, no theory (including EVT) will be able to come up
with any scientically sensible estimate. As such, hoping that EVT will
be helpful here is illusory. However, within quantitatively well dened sub{
categories, like the examples in Figures 1{4, one could use EVT and come up
with a model for the far tail of the loss distribution and base on it a possible
out{of{sample tail t. Based on these tail models, one could estimate VaR
and risk measures that go beyond VaR, such as Conditional VaR (C{VaR)
OR{C{VaR
T+1
1− = E
 
LT+1 j LT+1 > OR{VaR
T+1
1−

or more sophisticated coherent risk measures; see Artzner et al. [2]. Also,
based on extreme value methodology, one could estimate a conditional loss
distribution function for the operational risk category(ies) under investiga-
tion,
FT+1;u(u + x)=P (LT+1 − u  x j LT+1 >u ) ;x  0;
where u is typically a predetermined high loss level. For instance one could
take u = OR{VaR
T+1
1−. See Section 4.1 for more details on this.
We reiterate the need for extensive data modelling and pooling before
risk measures of the above type can be calculated with a reasonable degree
of accuracy. In the next section we oer some methodological building blocks
which will be useful when more quantitative modelling of certain operational10
risk categories will be demanded. The main benet we see lies in a bank
internal modelling, rather than a solution towards a capital charge calcula-
tion. As such, the methods we introduce have already been tested and made
operational within a banking environment; see Ebn¨ other [24] and Ebn¨ other
et al. [25], for instance.
4 Towards a theory
Since certain operational risk data are in many ways akin to insurance losses,
it is clear that methods from the eld of (non{life) insurance can play a fun-
damental role in their quantitative analysis. In this section we discuss some
of these tools, also referred to as Insurance Analytics. For a discussion of the
latter terminology, see Embrechts [27]. A further comparison with actuarial
methodology can, for instance, be found in Duy [23].
4.1 Extreme Value Theory (EVT)
Going back to the re insurance data (denoted X1;:::;X n)i nF i g u r e6 ,
a standard EVT analysis goes as follows:
(EVT-1) Plot the empirical mean excess function
b en(u)=
Pn
k=1(Xk − u)
+
Pn
k=1IfXk>ug
as a function of u and look for (almost) linear behaviour beyond some
threshold value. For the re insurance data, b en(u)i sp l o t t e di nF i g u r e8 .
A possible threshold choice is u = 1, i.e. for this case, a value low in
the data.
(EVT-2) Use the so{called Peaks{Over{Threshold (POT) method to t an
EVT{model to the data above u = 1; plot the data (dots) and the11
tted model (solid line) on log{log scale. Linearity indicates Pareto{
type power behaviour of the loss distribution P (X1 >x )=x−h(x);
see Figure 9.
(EVT-3) Estimate risk measures like a 99% VaR { and 99% C{VaR { and
calculate 95% condence intervals around these risk measures; see Fig-
ure 9.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
••• •
•
• •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
Threshold
M
e
a
n
 
E
x
c
e
s
s
Figure 8: Empirical mean excess function for the re loss data.
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Figure 9: Empirical and tted distribution tails on log-log scale, including
estimates for VaR and C{VaR for the re loss data.
The estimates obtained are b  =1 :04 with corresponding 99% VaR value
of 120 and estimated 99% C{VaR of 2890. Figure 9 contains the so{called12
prole likelihood curves with maximal values in the estimated VaR and C{
VaR. A 95% condence interval around the 99% VaR 120 is given by (69;255).
The right vertical axis gives the condence interval levels. The interval itself
is obtained by cutting the prole likelihood curves at the 95% point. A
similar construction (condence interval) can be obtained for the C{VaR;
due to a value of b  (=1.04) close to 1, a very large 95% condence interval
is obtained. An  value less than one would correspond to an innite mean
model. A value between one and two yields an innite variance, nite mean
model. By providing these (very wide) condence intervals in this case, EVT
already warns the user that we are walking very close (or even too close) to
t h ee d g eo ft h ea v a i l a b l ed a t a . T h es o f t w a r eu s e d ,E V I S( E x t r e m eV a l u e s
In S{Plus) was developed by Alexander McNeil and can be downloaded via
http://www.math.ethz.ch/mcneil.
The basic result underlying the POT method is that the marked point
process of excesses over a high threshold u, under fairly general (though
very precise!) conditions, can be well approximated by a compound Poisson
process (see Figure 10):
N(u) X
k=1
YkTk
where (Yk) iid have a generalised Pareto distribution, the exceedances of u
form a homogeneous Poisson process and both are independent. See Lead-
better [40] for details. A consequence of the Poisson property is that inter{
exceedance times of u are iid, exponential. Hence such a model forms a good
rst guess. More advanced techniques can be introduced taking, for instance,
non{stationarity and covariate modelling into account; see Embrechts [26],
Chavez{Demoulin and Embrechts [14] and Coles [15] for a discussion of these
techniques. The asymptotic independence between exceedance times and ex-
cesses makes likelihood tting straightforward.13
We once more instruct the reader to look very carefully at the conditions
needed before a POT analysis can be performed and be well aware of the
\garbage in garbage out" problem; see Embrechts et al. [29], pp. 194, 270,
343. EVIS allows for several diagnostic checks on these conditions.
t
Xt
u
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1n T1 TN(u)
Figure 10: Stylised presentation of the POT method.
When we turn to the mean excess plots for the operational risk data
from Figures 1{3 (for the type specic data) and Figure 4 (for the pooled
data) we clearly see the typical increasing (nearly linear) trends indicating
heavy{tailed, Pareto type losses; see Figures 11{14 and compare them with
Figure 8. As a rst step, we can carry out the above extreme value analysis
for the pooled data, though a rened analysis, taking non{stationarity into
account is no doubt necessary. As an example, we use the POT method to
t a generalised Pareto distribution to the pooled losses above u =0 :4. We
estimate the 99% VaR and the 99% C{VaR, including their 95% condence
intervals; see Figure 15. For the VaR we get a point estimate of 9.1, and a 95%
condence interval of (6:0;18:5). The 99% C{VaR beyond 9.1 is estimated
as 25.9, and the lower limit for its 95% condence interval is 11.7. Since, as
in the re insurance case, the tails are very heavy (b  =1 :63), we get a very
large estimate for the upper condence limit for C{VaR.14
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Figure 11: Mean excess plot for op-
erational risk losses, Type 1.
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Figure 12: Mean excess plot for op-
erational risk losses, Type 2.
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Figure 13: Mean excess plot for op-
erational risk losses, Type 3.
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Figure 14: Mean excess plot for
pooled operational risk losses.15
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Figure 15: Empirical and tted distribution tails for pooled operational losses
on log-log scale, including estimates for VaR and C{VaR.
As already discussed before, the data in Figure 4 may contain a transition
from more sparse data over the rst half of the period under investigation to
more frequent losses over the second half. It also seems that the early losses
(in Figure 4 for instance) are not only more sparse, but also heavier. Again,
this may be due to the way in which operational loss data bases are built up
for years some distance in the past; one only \remembers" the larger losses.
Our EVT analysis can (and should) be adjusted for such a switch in size
and/or intensity; once more, Chavez{Demoulin and Embrechts [14] contains
the relevant methodology. We will come back to this point in the next section,
where we allow ourselves to make a more mathematical (actuarial) excursion
in the realm of insurance risk theory.
4.2 Ruin theory revisited
Given that (1) yields the total operational risk loss of s dierent sub{catego-
ries during a given year, it can be seen as resulting from a superposition of
several (namely s) compound processes. So far, we are not aware of studies
which establish detailed features of individual processes nor their interdepen-
dencies. Note that in Ebn¨ other [24] and Ebn¨ other et al. [25] conditions on16
the aggregated process are imposed; independence, or dependence through
a common Poisson shock model. For the moment, we summarise (1) in a
stylised way as follows:
Lt =
N(t) X
k=1
Yk ;
where N(t) is the total number of losses over a time period [0;t]a c r o s sa l ls
categories and the Yk's are the individual losses, we drop the various indices.
From an actuarial point of view, it would now be natural to consider an
initial (risk) capital u and a premium rate c>0 and dene the cumulative
risk process
Ct = u + ct − Lt ;t  0: (2)
In Figure 16 we have plotted such a risk process for the pooled operational
risk losses shown in Figure 4. Also here, the \regime switch" is clearly seen,
splitting the time axis in roughly pre{ and past{1998.
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Figure 16: Risk process Ct with u = 50, c = 28 and the loss process from
Figure 4.
Given a small >0, for the process in (2), a risk capital u c a nt h e nb e
calculated putting the so{called ruin probability over a given time horizon
[T;T]e q u a lt o:
Ψ
 
u;T;T

= P

inf
TtT
(u + ct − Lt) < 0

= : (3)17
The level of insolvency 0 is just chosen for mathematical convenience. One
could, for instance, see c as a premium rate paid to an external insurer taking
(part of) the operational risk losses or as a rate paid to (or accounted for by)
a bank internal oce. The rate c paid, and the capital u calculated would
then be incorporated in the unit's overall risk capital.
Classical actuarial ruin theory concerns estimation of Ψ(u;T;T)i ng e n -
eral and Ψ(u;T)=Ψ ( u;0;T), 0 <T1in particular, and this for a wide
class of processes. The standard assumption in the famous Cram er{Lundberg
model is that (N(t)) is a homogeneous Poisson() process, independent of
the losses (Yk) iid with distribution function G and mean <1. Under the
so{called net{prot condition (NPC), c= > , one can show that, for \small
claims" Yk, there exist a constant R 2 (0;1) (the so{called adjustment or
Lundberg constant) and a constant C 2 (0;1) so that:
Ψ(u)=Ψ ( u;1) <e
−Ru ;u  0; (4)
and
lim
u!1e
RuΨ(u)=C: (5)
The small claims condition leading to the existence of R>0 can be expressed
in terms of E(eRYk) and typically holds for distribution functions with expo-
nentially bounded tails. The constant C can be calculated explicitly. See for
instance Grandell [36], Asmussen [3] and Rolski et al. [50] for details. For
operational risk losses, the small claims condition underlying the so{called
Cram er{Lundberg estimates (4) and (5) are typically not satised. Opera-
tional risk losses are heavy{tailed (power tail behaviour) as can be seen from
Figures 11{14. Within the Cram er{Lundberg model, the innite{horizon
(T = 1) ruin estimate for Ψ(u)=Ψ ( u;1) becomes (see Embrechts and18
Veraverbeke [32], Embrechts et al. [29]):
Ψ(u)  (
c

− )
−1
Z 1
u
(1 − G(x))dx; u !1: (6)
Hence the ruin probability Ψ(u) is determined by the tail of the loss distri-
bution 1 − G(x) for x large, meaning that ruin (or a given limit excess) is
caused by typically one (or few) large claim(s). For a more detailed discussion
on this \path leading to ruin" see Embrechts et al. [29], Section 8.3 and the
references given there. The asymptotic estimate (6) holds under very general
conditions of heavy tailedness, the simplest one being 1 − G(x)=x−h(x)
for h slowly varying and >1. In this case (6) becomes
Ψ(u)  Cu
1−h(u);u !1; (7)
where C =[ (  − 1)(
c
 − )]−1. Hence ruin decays polynomially (slow) as
a function of the initial (risk) capital u. Also for lognormal claims, the esti-
mate (6) holds. In the actuarial literature, the former result was rst proved
by von Bahr [7], the latter by Thorin and Wikstad [52]. The nal version for
so{called subexponential claims is due to Embrechts and Veraverbeke [32].
In contrast to the small claims regime estimates (4) and (5), the heavy{tailed
claims case (6) seems to be robust with respect to the underlying assump-
tions of the claims process. Besides the classical Cram er{Lundberg model,
an estimate similar to (6) also holds for the following processes:
{ Replace the homogeneous Poisson process (N(t)) by a general renewal
process; see Embrechts and Veraverbeke [32]. Here the claim interar-
rival times are still independent, but have a general distribution func-
tion, not necessarily exponential.
{ Generalisations to risk processes with dependent interclaim times, al-
lowing for possible dependence between the arrival process and the19
claim sizes are discussed in Asmussen [3], Section IX.4. The general-
isations contain the so{called Markov{modulated models as a special
case; see also Asmussen et al. [6]. In these models, the underlying in-
tensity model follows a nite state Markov chain, enabling for instance
the modelling of underlying changes in the economy in general or the
market in particular.
{ Ruin estimates for risk processes perturbed by a diusion, or by more
general stochastic processes are for instance to be found in Furrer [33],
Schmidli [51] and Veraverbeke [53].
{ A very general result of the type (7) for the distribution of the ultimate
supremum of a random walk with a negative drift is derived in Mikosch
and Samorodnitsky [43]. Mathematically, these results are equivalent
with ruin estimation for a related risk model.
For all of these models an estimate of the type (7) holds. Invariably, the
derivation is based on the so{called \one large claim heuristics"; see As-
mussen [3], p. 264. These heuristics may eventually play an important role
in the analysis of operational risk data.
As already discussed above, as yet, there is no clear stochastic model
available for the general operational risk process (1). Consequently, it would
be useful to nd a way to obtain a broad class of risk processes for which (7)
holds. A solution to this problem is presented in Embrechts and Samorod-
nitsky [31] through a combination of the \one large claim heuristics" and the
notion of operational time (time change). Below we restrict attention to the
innite horizon case Ψ(u). First of all, the estimate (7) is not ne enough
for accurate numerical approximations, it rather gives a benchmark estimate
of ruin (insolvency) deliminating the heavy{tailed (\one claim causes ruin")20
situation from the light{tailed estimates in (4) and (5) where most (small)
claims contribute equally and ruin is remote, i.e. has an exponentially small
probability. For a discussion on numerical ruin estimates of the type (7), see
Asmussen and Binswanger [4], and Asmussen et al. [5].
Suppose that we are able to estimate ruin over an innite horizon for
a general stochastic (loss) process (Lt), a special case of which is the classi-
cal Cram er{Lundberg total claim process in (2) or the risk processes listed
above. Suppose now that, for this general loss process (Lt), we have a ruin
estimate of the form (7). From (Lt), more general risk processes can be
constructed using the concept of time change ((t)). The latter is a posi-
tive, increasing stochastic process typically (but not exclusively) modelling
economic or market activity. The more general process (L(t))i st h eo n e
we are really interested in, since its added ﬂexibility could allow to model
the stylised facts of operational risk data as discussed in Section 2. We can
then look at this general time{changed process and dene its corresponding
innite horizon ruin function:
Ψ(u)=P

sup
t0
(L(t) − ct) >u

and ask for conditions on the process parameters involved, as well as for
conditions on ((t)), under which
lim
t!1
Ψ(t)
Ψ(t)
=1; (8)
meaning that, asymptotically, ruin is of the same order of magnitude in the
time changed (more realistic) process as it is for the original (more stylised)
process. These results can be interpreted as a kind of robustness charac-
terisation for general risk processes so that the polynomial ruin probability
estimate (7) holds. In Embrechts and Samorodnitsky [31], besides general21
results for (8) to hold, specic examples are discussed. Motivated by the ex-
ample of transaction risk (see Table 1), Section 3 in the latter paper discusses
the case of mixing through Markov chain switching models, also referred to
as Markov modulated or Markov renewal processes. In the context of oper-
ational risk, it is natural to consider a class of time change processes ((t))
in which time runs at a dierent rate in dierent time intervals, depending
on the state of a certain underlying Markov chain. The Markov chain stays
in each state a random amount of time, with a distribution that depends
on that state. Going back to the transaction risk case, one can think of the
Markov chain states as resulting from an underlying market volume (inten-
sity) index. These changes in volumes traded may for instance have an eect
on back oce errors. The results obtained in Embrechts and Samorodnit-
sky [31] may be useful to characterise interesting classes of loss processes
where ruin behaves like in (7). Recall from Figure 5 the fact that certain
operational risk losses show periods of high (and low) intensity. Future dy-
namic models for sub{categories of operational risk losses will have to take
these characteristics into account. The discussion above is mainly aimed at
showing that tools for such problems are at hand and await the availability
of more detailed loss data bases.
Some remarks are in order here. Within classical insurance risk theory,
a full solution linking heavy{tailedness of the claim distribution to the long{
tailedness of the corresponding ruin probability is discussed in Asmussen [3].
Alternative models leading to similar distributional conclusions are to be
found in the analysis of teletrac data; see for instance Resnick and Samorod-
nitsky [49]. Whereas the basic operational risk model in (1) may be of a more
general nature than the ones discussed above, support seems to exist that
under fairly general conditions, the tail behaviour of P(LT+1 >x ) will be22
power like. Further, the notion of time change may seem somewhat arti-
cial. This technique has however been around in insurance mathematics for
a long time in order to transform a complicated loss process to a more stan-
dard one; see for instance Cram er [16] or B¨ uhlmann [13]. Within nance,
these techniques were introduced through the fundamental work of Olsen and
Associates on {time; see Dacorogna et al. [19]. Further references are An e
and Geman [1], Geman et al. [34, 35] and more recently Barndor{Nielsen
and Shephard [8]; they use time change techniques to transform a nancial
time series with randomness in the volatility to a standard Black{Scholes{
Merton model. The situation is somewhat akin to the relationship between
a Brownian motion based model (like the Black{Scholes{Merton model) and
the more recent models based on general semi{martingales. It is a well{
known result, see Monroe [44], that any semi{martingale can be written as
a time changed Brownian motion.
4.3 Further tools
In the previous section, we brieﬂy discussed some (heavy{tailed) ruin type
estimates which, in view of the data already available on operational risk,
may become useful. From the realm of insurance, several further techniques
may be used. Below we mention some of them without entering into details.
Recall from (1) that typically a yearly operational risk variable will be of the
form:
L =
N X
k=1
Yk (9)
where N is some discrete random variable counting the total number of
claims within a given period across all s loss classes, say, and Yk denotes
the kth claim. Insurance mathematics has numerous models of the type (9)
starting with the case where N is a random variable independent of the iid23
claims (Yk) with distribution function G, say. In this case, one immediately
has that
P(L>x )=
1 X
k=1
P(N = k)
 
1 − G
k(x)

(10)
where Gk denotes the kth convolution of G. Again, in the case that 1 −
G(x)=x−h(x), and the moment generating function of N is analytic in 1,
it is shown in Embrechts et al. [29] that
P(L>x )  E(N)x
−h(x);x !1:
Several procedures exist for numerically calculating (10) under a wide range
of conditions. These include recursive methods like the Panjer{Euler method
for claim number distributions satisfying P(N = k)=( a +
b
k)P(N = k − 1)
for k =1 ;2;::: (see Panjer [45]), and Fast Fourier Transform methods (see
Bertram [11]). Gr¨ ubel and Hermesmeier [37, 38] are excellent review papers
containing further references. The actuarial literature contains numerous
publications on the subject; good places to start are Panjer and Willmot [46]
and Hogg and Klugman [39].
Finally, looking at (1), several aggregation operations are going on, in-
cluding the superposition of the dierent loss frequency processes (Nt;i)i=1;:::;s
and the aggregation of the dierent loss size variables
 
Y
t;i
k

k=1;:::;Nt;i;i=1;:::;s.
For the former, techniques from the theory of point processes are available;
see for instance Daley and Vere{Jones [20]. The issue of dependence mod-
elling within and across operational risk loss types will no doubt play a cru-
cial role; copula techniques, as introduced in risk management in Embrechts
et al. [30], can no doubt be used here.24
5 Final comment
As already stated in the introduction, conditional on the further development
and implementation of quantitative operational risk measurement within the
nancial industry, tools from the realm of insurance as discussed in this
paper may well become relevant. Our paper serves the goal of a better ex-
change of ideas between actuaries and risk managers. Even if one assumes
full replicability of operational risk losses within the several operational risk
sub{categories, their interdependence will make detailed modelling dicult.
The theory presented in this paper is based on specic conditions and can
be applied in cases where testing has shown that these underlying assump-
tions are indeed fullled. The ongoing discussions around Basel II will show
at which level the tools presented will become useful. We strongly doubt
however that a full operational risk capital charge can be based solely on
statistical modelling.
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